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The studies presented in this format generally retain an unfinished character. They are circulated to insure some exchange prior to completion and possible publication. It is therefore requested that they not be quoted or referred to in public without the formal authorization of the author.

Working Paper Number 13:

Sexual Oppression and Class Oppression

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Introduction to Working Paper 13

The study by Stephanie Coontz that we are now publishing in this Working Paper of the IIRE discusses some central issues related to the analysis of the roots of female oppression, to the understanding of class and gender, and to the method of Marxism itself. It is a draft, intended to stimulate collective and international discussions and elaborations.

We are circulating this Working Paper in the framework of preparations for the Seminar on Women’s Oppression and Struggles due to take place at the I.I.R.E. in September-October 1991. It should later be developed into a Notebook for Study and Research.

This is the second WP-IIRE that we are publishing for the 1991 Women Seminar. The first one is the WP n°9, “Lessons from Women’s Everyday Forms of Resistance in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia”, by Carol McAllister. We hope to publish before the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 several more Working Papers on women’s issues. We would be very happy to receive proposals, especially from those to whom these WP-IIRE have been sent.
Preface

This draft represents a tentative outline of a paper exploring the nature and origins of female oppression and assessing the relevance of Marxist theory to these issues. I argue that traditional Marxism's failure to incorporate gender into its explanation of inequality has given us a partial understanding not just of the women's movement but of class itself. My thesis is, however, that the methods of Marxism allow for self-correction on this issue, enabling us to explore the origins of male dominance and racism and in so doing to reconceptualize class itself. It is not a question of adding gender analysis to class analysis, or even showing how they intersect, but of using gender (and race, though this point needs further development in a future paper) to reach a deeper, more historical, and more useful definition of class.

This draft is partial, because other writing commitments prevent me from filling in all the points adequately. Some points are left undeveloped because they are obvious and merely need a good selection of examples; others are undeveloped because I haven't researched or analyzed them enough to present a complete argument. I hope, however, that there will be a long-term advantage in this short-term inadequacy: that the gaps in the outline will stimulate others to come forward with ideas, suggestions, examples, and criticisms that can turn the final paper into a truly collaborative effort. I hope, then, that readers treat this as an evolving discussion to which they will contribute both supporting and conflicting examples, additions, and modifications to the various theoretical issues raised, as well as suggestions for reorganization or new directions.
Marxism's historic contributions to analysis of male domination

A. Marx and Engels were among the first to suggest that the status of women was an important consideration in evaluating human societies. They argued that male dominance developed out of historic circumstances and that it was both possible and necessary to improve the status of women.

2. See Eleanor's Leacock's assessment of his insights and limits in her introduction to the International Publishers version.

B. Marx and Engels also laid the groundwork for analyzing male-female relations and family organization because they went beyond contemporary political economists in recognizing that production for exchange was a small and transitory aspect of human existence. A few quotations show the richness of their analysis:

According to the materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life. This, again, is of a two-fold character: on the one side, the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. Engels, Origin of the Family

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of man. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.

C. Marx's concept of the labor theory of value differed from that of his contemporaries because he recognized that this way of ascertaining value was not only historically specific to capitalism but was also a critique of capitalist social relations. Under capitalism, only labor that is exchanged against capital is productive labor that produces value. In consequence, human cooperative work is disguised and controlled by the exchange of things. Indeed, the most important kinds of work that humans do -- production for joy, for life, for pure creativity -- produce no value under capitalism (See Theories of Surplus Value). This recognition paves the way for a total rejection of standards that devalue the work historically assigned to women.

D. The Marxian emphasis on relations of production rather than forces of production opens the way for an analysis of power, gender, race, and social conflict as well as for rejection of technological or economic determinism. Two books that draw out this dynamic side of Marxist theory are S.H. Rigby, Marxism and History: A Critical Introduction (New
York: St. Martin's, 1987) and Richard Miller, Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History (Princeton U. Press, 1984). A theory that focuses on relations, contradictions, and transformations has the potential to get past the dead-end notion of biologically-mandated female subordination to the problem of how to deal with real differences in a non-hierarchical way.

E. Nancy Hartsock points out, moreover, that the Marxist distinction between appearance and essence, circulation and production, the abstract and the concrete, which lead to the notion of diametrically opposed "standpoints," opens the way for a rich understanding of women's special role in the struggle for socialist transformation. "The Marxian category of labor," similarly, "including as it does both interactions with other humans and with the natural world, can help to cut through the dichotomy of nature and culture" which has paralyzed so many studies of women's roles.
As we know, however, many followers of Marx and Engels have interpreted other aspects of their work to justify a more narrow emphasis on the primacy of productive forces and of those conflicts that arise directly at the point of production of value—e.g., of commodities. There certainly are formulations in Marx and Engels to justify this approach, and these are connected with other theoretical limitations that have persisted in the Marxist tradition and thrown up barriers to both our theory and practice of women’s liberation.

A. One such limitation is that Marx and Engels never fully escaped the Victorian assumption of their society that most sexual and gender interactions were part of nature, and that nature was of a lower order than culture. While Marx correctly noticed that the first division of labor was between men and women, he wrongly equated this with sexual intercourse, conflated the complex, variable range of sexual roles in pre-class families into "normal" sex and childbearing, and suggested that the division of labor in the family was "natural." Accordingly, he concluded that the division of labor became "truly" significant only when the division between mental and manual labor appeared. He thus missed the chance to incorporate gender relations and sexual systems into a theory of production and social conflict. Both Marx and Engels shared many of the androcentric prejudices of their time, including homophobia, stereotypes about men’s sexual aggression and women’s desire for monogamy, and the notion that men had a natural desire to pass their property down to their male flesh and blood.

B. Despite the nuances of Marx’s concrete historical analyses and despite Engels’ later attempts to explain that he and Marx had sometimes overemphasized economic factors only in order to highlight certain relations that most contemporaries ignored, Marx and Engels—and even more their later followers—tended in their theoretical statements to stress conflicts at the point of production and exchange as the main or sole source of change in class society. When later Marxists attempted to add women to this scheme, they restricted their analysis to women’s direct or derived relationship to the means of production. Marxist theory was not designed primarily to explain differences among people with similar relations to the means of production, or even to explain why any particular group came to have a privileged relation to the means of production. Instead, Marxism sought to explain how a minority of individuals controlled the lives of the majority through their control over a society’s productive resources. Alison Jaggar writes:

In order to explain this, traditional Marxism focused on human beings in relation to commodity production and in this relation, of course, people appear only as members of classes, such as the bourgeoisie or the petit bourgeoisie. They are seen as having neither sex nor gender (nor race). Thus, women in the market are viewed simply as workers rather than as women workers...

Consequently, women who work at home do not have an independent place within a Marxist analysis of capitalism; they take their class position from that of their husbands and fathers....The result is an essentially gender-blind picture of social reality.

Feminists argue that many manifestations of women’s oppression are not captured in the categories of Marxist political economy. Women share common experiences of oppression which, though they may be mediated by class, race and ethnicity, nevertheless cut across class lines. All women are liable to rape, to physical abuse from men in the home, and to sexual objectification and sexual harassment; all women are primarily responsible for housework, while all women who have children are held primarily responsible for the care of those children; and virtually all women who work...
in the market work in sex-segregated jobs. In all classes, women have less money, power, and leisure time than men.  

C. Failure to deal with these gender dynamics led many Marxists to assume that the sole or at least dominant cause of women's oppression was the social marginality of women's work and the private nature of women's products and services. This economistic approach consistently led to wrong predictions: e.g., that the entry of women into public work would dissolve sex role distinctions and destroy the bourgeois family; that employers would substitute cheap female labor for male when it was in their interests; that a strong labor movement or the abolition of capitalism would lead to the full integration of women into social struggles and advances. Jaggar argues that such wrong predictions flow from Marxism's lack of categories for analyzing gender:

Traditional Marxist categories were not designed to capture the essential features of the sexual division of labor, and it is doubtful whether they are capable of doing the job. Within the public economy, for instance, there is in fact a sharp separation between jobs that are considered appropriate for men and those that are considered suitable for women; men and women rarely work side by side at the same job. The gender-blind categories of Marxist theory, however, obscure rather than reveal this fact. Even more seriously, the central Marxist categories hardly apply at all to the household, which is the traditional area of women's work. Marxist theory focuses primarily on production, and it defines household work, especially the household work of capitalism, as being outside production. Instead, household work is defined as reproduction, that is, the reproduction of human labor power.

Marxism provides a clear acknowledgement of the social necessity of this woman's work. It recognizes explicitly the obvious fact that no society could continue without both consumption and procreation. In contrast with its close examination of production, however, Marxism does not provide much theoretical analysis of either of these other two aspects of social life, relying instead on an intuitive understanding of them. Many Marxists initially believed that the move of women into paid employment would lead to their equality with men of their own class. The tremendous transformative power of capitalism, with its tendency to draw all labor exchanges into the commodity system, would create the preconditions for female liberation. When this did not occur, attention returned to the persistence of women's unpaid labor. This led to a long debate over whether women's housework and child-raising were productive or unproductive labor. Later drafts of this paper will review the debate over productive vs. unproductive labor, touching on the arguments of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and others that women's work contributes to surplus value because it allows capitalists to pay male labor below its actual costs of reproduction. We will also review arguments that women's work is socially necessary but without value and theories that stress the ideological or psychological function of male dominance in disciplining, dividing, or "paying off" the working class.

The productive labor debate, however, was too narrowly conceived. In attempting to explain why women did not gain liberation when they left the family to join the labor market, for example, theorists variously blamed the pressure of capitalist ideology, the repressive nature of the family as a tool for the reproduction of capitalism, or capitalism's creation of a dual labor market. Many of these suffered from the usual weaknesses of functionalism: first the confusion between why something occurs and how it operates in a particular system; second, the assumption that society works in a mechanical, logical way to further the aims of its dominant group. Economistic Marxists had special problems in explaining why management did not substitute cheap female labor for more expensive male labor whenever possible: when some radical feminists contended that management was stopped by the resistance of male workers attempting to hang on to their privileges, such Marxists fell back on the idea that capitalists are able to put aside their short-term profits in order to preserve the larger conditions for class reproduction, these being the maintenance of the working-class family.

But today, in both England and America, it is marginal right-wingers, not corporate leaders or the most influential political figures, who oppose the expansion of women's work and of child care (though the two groups often
make temporary alliance in their opposition to state funding for child care. Some Marxists mistakenly continue to identify the right-wing program with that of the capitalists; others have retreated uneasily into vague formulations about the "contradictions" of capitalism. Both tend to deny the empirical evidence put forward by radical feminists that much of the opposition to women's full participation at work comes from sections of the working population. Their failure to confront this fact allows Heidi Hartmann and Ann Foreman to claim that male workers attempt to confine women to the family in order to retain their wives' personal services and mitigate their own alienation.  In denying this across the board, Marxists have been so far unable to give a nuanced account of the origins and evolution of demands for a family wage and for protective legislation.

D. Another aspect of Marxian thought that has been problematic for the study of women is the rather linear view of progress that sometimes conflicts with the Marxist understanding of contradiction. As products of their own time, Marx and Engels could not help but incorporate some elements of the 19th-century view of progress into their theory. Though to a far less degree than their contemporaries, they had a tendency to think unilinearly and one-sidedly about the "march" toward a classless society, often describing events as historically or "objectively" progressive. The failure of Marxists to repudiate this tendency has caused problems in our analysis of women's situation. For over and over again, developments that favored the expansion of technology, the extension of democratic rights to men (including male workers) and the consolidation of workers' organizations simultaneously undermined women's position or made women more dependent on men. The great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries expanded democratic rights for males and paved the way for male working-class solidarity but actually closed off loopholes that women had formerly used to exercise political and economic power. The great organizational successes of the American Federation of Labor in the early 1900s led to protective legislation that deprived many women of good jobs and made working-class wives more dependent on their husbands. In many formerly colonial countries, women have simply faced more work and more isolation as men have been drawn into modern economic relations and benefited from new technologies.

E. We have also consistently underestimated or down-played the extent and intractability of male domination and female oppression in a wide range of settings, including non-economic ones. The content and form of women's oppression seem, at least at first glance, remarkably consistent across time and space. As the United Nations reports, women are half the world's population, but they perform 2/3 of the world's work hours, take home 1/10 the world's income and own only 1% of the world's property.

The extent and nature of this oppression is not easily explained by economic interests or traditional class analysis. Much of the oppression is non-economic, and men's commitment to male dominance often cuts across class interests. Ruth Milkman and others have demonstrated that sex stereotyping of work is extraordinarily persistent and that the principle of such divisions is seldom challenged even when it works against workers' interests. Over and over again, male unionists have refused to involve women in organizing drives or to adopt demands for women's issues, even when this clearly resulted in divisions among workers, while both men and women workers have accepted stereotypes about "good" women and "bad" that prevent women from playing a militant role in labor struggles. Blewett's study of the 1860 shoemakers' strike reveals that strike leaders who were otherwise militant and honest were prepared to falsify votes, intimidate other workers, and lie about meeting times in order to exclude women's demands.
The oppression of women seems powered by intense and irrational drives, taking violent forms that lack the underlying logic of many class conflicts. During the Middle Ages, almost half a million women were burned as witches. In places as diverse as Bangkok, Thailand, and Nicaragua, almost 50% of men beat their wives or lovers. In Quito, Ecuador, 80% of the women are reported to have been physically abused. In America, 4 women die every day from battering at the hands of a lover or husband. In many areas in the Middle East and Africa, female genitals are mutilated to ensure virginity and restrict the capacity for sexual pleasure. Women in almost all known societies are subject to rape. In India, bride-burning or dowry-deaths are common; in China, female infanticide is still practiced in the countryside. The incredible depth and breadth of sexual violence, including the recurring association of sexual activity with aggression and death, need both theoretical explanation and practical action. Any analysis that treats the mass murder and torture of women as an epiphenomenon of class struggle deserves the rejection it meets from victims of this violence.

Finally, traditional class analysis does not explain why male dominance clearly exists in societies that either lack class divisions or claim to have made strides toward getting rid of them. While male dominance is not universal, it seems to precede the development of the extreme socioeconomic inequality that leads to classes and to the emergence of the state.
The failure of Marxism to explain these and other phenomena has led some people to argue that male dominance precedes and over-rides class. At the very least, many feminist theorists have suggested that class analysis is insufficient and that we need to turn our theoretical and practical attention to the analysis of gender relations and family or kinship systems.

A. Some theorists argue that the fundamental category of analysis should be the sex-gender system. The next draft of the paper will discuss the work of Gayle Rubin, Shulamith Firestone, Susan Brownmiller, Nancy Chodorow, and others who argue that gender distinctions structure nearly every aspect of human social existence and produce both the model and metaphor for most other inequalities of power.

Most of these theories of sexual difference, however, are based on assumptions about the universal nature and extent of female subordination. Such assumptions are based on faulty observation and ahistorical generalization.

In the first place, many observers of non-western societies have simply been unable to divest themselves of their own cultural preconceptions. Male ethnographers have dealt with male informants, accepting any uncomplimentary remarks these may make about women as the social reality, and ignoring equally disparaging comments about men made by women. A number of anthropologists have recently gone back to the original anthropological sources on various cultures and found that the 'masters' had reported almost exclusively on male activities and prerogatives, ignoring or down-playing equivalent female activities, rights, and prestige systems. Among the pre-colonial Ashanti, for example, 'the head of state was a female position' but in accounts of Ashanti life this is often only 'mentioned in passing, designated by the misnomer "queen mother", although she was never the king's wife, and was not necessarily his mother. She did not hold her position by virtue of her relationship with him; indeed it was she who appointed him, and was above him in the state hierarchy.'

A second major problem with the collection of cross-cultural examples 'proving' the universality of male dominance is the ahistorical nature of such evidence. Two major geographical areas where extreme male-domination of women is well-documented in non-state societies are Melanesia and South America. But Melanesia is an area where rapid socioeconomic and status differentiation had taken place prior to Western observations, and the status of women seems to have been declining from a previously higher position. In South America, devolution from larger political entities had taken place, there was extreme (and atypical) population pressure and warfare. In both these cases, the low status of women should be related to the tensions and pressures consequent on economic, political, and demographic transformation, not to any universal male-female dynamics. On close examination, in fact, many cases of male domination in 'primitive' societies seem to have evolved only under the pressure of trade or warfare following contact with expanding groups, or under the direct impact of colonialism.

Finally, there are examples of societies in which asymmetry between the sexes is difficult or impossible to discern. Among the Mbuti, for example, 'both men and women see themselves as equal in all respects except the supremely vital one that, whereas the woman can (and on occasion does) do almost everything the male does, she can do one thing no male can do: give birth to life.' And Peggy Sanday describes five societies that offer or offered 'scripts for female power'.

Yet, radical feminism has two fundamental insights: the pervasiveness of gender inequality and the failure of gender-blind theories to analyze one of the central linchpins of all social inequality. A more nuanced expression of these insights and their implication for Marxism is found in Alison Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Socialist feminism,
she argues, claims:

that our "inner" lives, as well as our bodies and behavior, are structured by gender; that this gender-structuring is not innate but is socially imposed; that the specific characteristics that are imposed are related systematically to the historically prevailing system of organizing social production; that the gender-structuring of our "inner" lives occurs when we are very young and is reinforced throughout our lives in a variety of different spheres; and that these relatively rigid masculine and feminine character structures are a very important element in maintaining male dominance. (p. 127)

Socialist feminists also claim that there is a historical pattern of gender relations that cries out for an analysis of exploitation and struggle such as Marxists usually reserve for class:

The controlling group has forced the subordinate groups to do sexual, productive and emotional labor for them; it has defined what work was done and how it was performed; it has benefited disproportionately from the labor of the subordinate groups; and it has used the work done by the subordinate groups to bring those groups even further under its control....Social feminists believe that the ruling group in the production of children and of sexual and emotional satisfaction has always been predominantly, though not exclusively, composed of men and that the laboring group in the production of these goods has always been composed predominantly and almost exclusively of women.... On the Marxist view, exploitation is forced, unpaid, surplus labor, the product of which is not controlled by the producers....Therefore, so long as men as a group control and derive primary benefit from the labor of women as a group, socialist feminists view men as a group or class that exploits women as a group or class.

The socialist feminist claim, then, is that the productive resources of society include the human capacity to perform a wide variety of types of labor. One of the most important of these productive resources historically has been women's capacity to bear children. On the socialist feminist view, therefore, the perennial struggle to control society's productive resources has always included a struggle to control the reproductive capacity of women. This struggle has occurred not only between men of different economic classes but also between women and men. To the extent that women and men have stood in different relations to the productive resources of society, this struggle may be viewed as a class struggle....It is a struggle in which women and men have always been on different sides as groups, although not necessarily as individuals.

This struggle, according to feminist analysis, cannot be understood so long as Marxists relegate "reproduction" to a "natural" sphere or treat it as a mere stage on which the "real" players--the producers and the surplus-takers--come into conflict. Rosalind Petchesky writes:

Production" and "reproduction", work and the family, far from being separate territories like the moon and the sun or the kitchen and the shop, are really intimately related modes that reverberate upon one another and frequently occur in the same social, physical, and even psychic spaces....Not only do reproduction and kinship, or the family, have their own, historically determined, products, material techniques, modes or organization and power relationships, but reproduction and kinship are themselves integrally related to the social relations of production and the state; they reshape these relations all the time."

How, then, do we define and analyze the system of reproduction? If it is not an invariant backdrop to a mode of production, neither is it a passive reflection. Indeed, changes in reproduction are often critical to the emergence of new productive systems. Changes in fertility rates, marriage systems, and mechanisms of male domination have often led to the accumulation of surpluses and the emergence of new elites, or have decisively shifted the relative power of contending classes. Once we recognize that such reproductive changes are not "natural," we must cease to regard them as mere backdrops to the "important" variables and ask ourselves what social dynamics influence fertility rates, extraction of household surpluses from women and children, availability of male labor, etc. As soon as we ask this question it becomes patently
absurd to answer that all these phenomena are outcomes of class relations: the balance of power between the sexes and the generations helps to shape class relations.

Because Marxists have generally failed to incorporate the analysis of such reproductive relations into their account of class dynamics, many feminist theorists have moved to develop a separate theory of gender relations. Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, for example, argue that we must develop a way of analyzing the "sex-affective production" relations that organize the bearing, rearing, and nurturing of children and adults. Throughout most of history, they point out, women have been assigned this work.

This division of labor is not a neutral one...It is an oppressive one, based upon inequality and reinforced by social relation[s] of domination. Characteristic inequalities include a longer working day with less material and emotional rewards than men, less control over family decisions, and less sexual freedom combined with less sexual satisfaction. Socialization in sex-affective production is also associated with restrictions on options, choices, and remuneration available to women in work outside of the family.19

Furthermore, this division of labor has its own material origins, productive relations, characteristic dynamics, and internal contradictions. Labor power is clearly extracted through household and kin relations long before it is organized through slavery or wage labor; differences in surplus accumulation due to the work of wives and children leads to social differences among households and kin groups; an ideological "superstructure" supports men's extraction of female surplus labor; and persistent gender and sexual conflicts accompany this process. Mechanisms of male domination over women also reinforce hierarchical relations among men. And restrictions on women flow not just from the immediate interests and desires of individual men but also from the dependence of the entire social structure on a particular form of sex-affective production.

Because male dominance takes such early, concrete, and systemic forms, Folbre argues that it is imprecise to describe it as an "accompaniment" of class society or a secondary "system of control over women" that grows out of the class relations of capitalism and/or other modes of production."19 She suggests that since a strong element of the Marxist definition of a mode of production is its investigation of how surplus labor time is appropriated and who gets it, we should understand patriarchy as a mode of production too, since patriarchy involves the appropriation of surplus labor from women to benefit men. We can best understand patriarchy's dynamics and its persistence, she argues, if we concentrate on the same questions that Marxists use in identifying a mode of production: how are social relations organized to appropriate and distribute surplus labor; what are the main dynamics of control in a given set of social relations; who benefits from them and who pays for them?

These are useful questions because they direct attention beyond psychological and ideological processes to the forces and relations of production involved in male dominance. The forces of production would, in this analogy, include: women's labor power (defined in traditional Marxist usage as including the education of the laborer, and, by only a small extension, her gender socialization into specializing at certain kinds of work); the technology of reproduction, child rearing, and housework; and women's reproductive capacity, including women's struggles to control their own bodies. The relations of production would include structures of control over the labor and reproductive powers of women, forms of organization of both exploiter and exploited, legal controls over women, etc:

A patriarchal mode of production can be defined as a distinctive set of social relations, including but by no means limited to control over the means of production, that structures the exploitation of women and/or children by men within a social formation that may include other modes of production, none of which is necessarily dominant (p. 330).

The conceptualization of male control over women as a mode of production is a powerful analogy, and a very useful one in that it directs our attention to the fact that the production and distribution of gender relations and meanings is a dynamic system. But because this approach asks such precise questions it reveals its own limits: In a kin corporate mode of production, the relations and forces of male dominance are qualitatively different than those to be found in a feudal mode of production or a capitalist one. Indeed, Ferguson and Folbre
point out the system of surplus extraction characteristic of capitalism increasingly conflicts with the surplus extraction characteristic of "patriarchy," by which they seemingly mean all non-capitalist male dominant systems. Attempting to define patriarchy in such a way as to encompass systems based on household labor, plantation labor, and factory labor, Folibre resorts to a definition of patriarchy that sounds more like a definition of class society in general than of any particular mode of production.

Patriarchal control over patriarchal means of production...can include: (1) capital, land, houses, farm or household equipment owned or controlled by patriarchs; (2) means of subsistence such as wages or other income that are controlled by patriarchs; and (3) means of reproduction, such as women's reproductive capacities, that are subject to patriarchal control (p. 330).

But this broad list of possibilities is not analogous to any mode of production described by Marxists. Marxists describe a mode of production by identifying particular forces of subsistence and production that interact with a specific matrix of cooperative and coercive relations. Folbre's list includes many of the variables Marxists look at to distinguish between modes of production; we would never use such a broad list to define a mode of production. While a term such as "patriarchs," for example, might describe the unity of male household power and general social control found in a patrilineal, ranked kinship society, it doesn't get at the dynamics of control in capitalism, and it conflates the capitalists who control women's paid labor with the husbands or ideologies that control women's work in the private sphere.

There are numerous advantages to analyzing the ways in which patriarchal relations help form a mode of production and shape its characteristic conflicts. Ultimately, however, the idea that patriarchy per se constitutes a mode of production has serious theoretical weaknesses. From one perspective, as we have seen, the definition is far too vague. In a patriarchal mode of production, are all men dominant over all women? Are black American men dominant over white American women, working-class men dominant over upper-class women? If it is true that the oppression of women makes all women subject to rape, it is also true that class and race make some men particularly vulnerable to charges of rape. If men have certain advantages vis a vis all women, in what ways are these limited by class and race? The notion of patriarchy as a mode of production provides no clear conceptual tools for answering these questions.

Subordination of women prevails in all unequal societies, but it takes very different forms and structures, is enforced by different agencies, and applies in unequal measure to different sorts of women and men. For example, in kinship societies there are major differences in the rights and obligations that accrue to sisters and to wives, to mothers and daughters-in-law. In state societies, similar differences divide women of different classes, even when they are playing superficially identical roles: housework is very different when performed by a middle-class and an upper-class housewife, not to mention when it is done by a paid domestic.

If the term patriarchy subsumes far too many variations in the forces and relations of male dominance over women, it is also used, often by the same authors, in a way that is far too narrow to support any overarching system of analysis. Thus Folbre argues: "Patriarchal exploitation can be defined...in terms of surplus labor time, or the difference between the amount of time individuals work and the amount of time embodied in the goods they themselves consume." Similarly, Harriet Fraad, Stephen Resnick, and Richard Wolff attempt to apply "precise" economic measures of surplus labor to the household. But when they begin to do so, they reduce the complexities of male-female power relations to a simplistic economic model of men expropriating all of a woman's labor beyond that required to reproduce her existence. While such a theoretical construct correctly highlights women's subordination within the family, it is too simplistic in describing male relations to the family and fails to grapple with the complexities of defining "surplus labor," especially in households with children or elders.

Men do gain material benefits from women's domestic labor, but calling this the production and appropriation of "surplus labor" misses some vital dynamic in gender and age inequalities. Men's privileges and domination are real, but men do not, so to speak, make a profit on these things. In modern society, for example, men do support women and children at a level beyond which the latter could repro-
duce themselves in this society (as post-divorce statistics on poverty show) at the same time as they appropriate work and deference from them. For the service they receive at home, moreover, men pay the price of much fuller and more permanent labor force attachment. They also pay a price at work: concepts of "manliness" undermine the ability to demand job safety; low wages paid to women drag down wages of all; the existence of segregated work fields makes entire male job categories subject to displacement by cheaper "female" categories.

This role of general male privilege in reinforcing the subordination of many men also prevailed in pre-capitalist class society: in hunting and gathering societies, for example, male access to adult roles depended upon marriage, for a man could not take off on lengthy and sometimes fruitless hunting trips unless he had a wife who was willing to provide food and clothes for him; the institution of restrictions on women's sexual and marital choices not only subordinated women but also gave elders power over young men, who could no longer simply marry by gaining a woman's favor but now had to go through her father. Similarly, the limitation of women to the domestic sphere in ancient state societies made men more exploitable in public sphere.

Jane Humphries makes the further point that women's domestic labor often enables the working class as a whole to enjoy a higher standard of living: the wife's extra time doesn't all go to the man. Humphries argues that all modes of production require some surplus labor above the costs of individual reproduction, in order to reproduce the community and the individual's ties to other people. She points out that we have underestimated the role of women's domestic labor in promoting class community, combatting individualism, passing on radical traditions and nurturing oppositional culture. Her analysis is vulnerable to charges that she overestimates how much support working-class families provide to non-laborers and underestimates how much privilege they extract for men, but she argues convincingly that early unions' exclusion of married women should not be attributed, as in Heidi Hartman's analysis, to the selfish material interests of individual working men. While it reinforced sexism and injured some women, adoption of domesticity was "One of the few sources of working-class control over the supply of labor" and "also one of the few tactics that could be accompanied by a supportive mobilization of bourgeois ideology." These complications suggest that male control over female labor is too intertwined with other aspects of production, exchange, and conflict to stand on its own as the defining mark of a mode of production.

Another problem with the attempt to define patriarchal relations on the material basis of men's extraction of women's surplus labor is that it suggests that upper-class women are not an oppressed or exploited group. For if your definition of an exploited group is primarily based on whether a group's "members consume more embodied labor than they perform" (which is actually quite different than a concept many radical feminists seem to conflate with this, whether "women tend to work longer hours than men") and if your primary definition of patriarchy is in terms of the differential between the labor men receive from women and the "ways" they pay, then upper-class women, by either criteria, are not exploited. In this case one of the primary advantages of patriarchal theory -- its recognition that all women share certain fundamental kinds of oppression -- disappears.

I would reserve the concept of patriarchy for specific cases in which male control over women (and children) intersects with or paves the way for the control of wealth-producing property. In some patriarchal kinship societies, for example, male household heads built on age and gender inequalities to extract household surpluses from wives and children. They then used these surpluses in feasting, gift-giving, and bride-wealth exchanges outside the household, thereby accumulating new labor, obligations, and clients from outside the family. The work of wives and children allowed certain chiefs to become "big men" and to parlay their rank and status into regular entitlements to labor from other households. During this process, as Engels recognized more than a century ago, wives can be said to occupy a class relationship to their husbands. In colonial America, the site of much production was the household, and property-owning men exercised their class power through their domestic roles: they literally had paternal power over apprentices and servants. Similarly, in 20th-century rural Turkey, landowning household heads used their traditional household prerogatives of age and gender to extract their relatives' labor in carpet-weaving workshops, thereby helping to inaugurate a new
mode of production. It is important to distinguish between such cases and other kinds of male dominance, else we miss some of the complexities of gender and class interactions. Typically, once a group of men does parley the expropriation of their wives' labor into more regular methods of labor extraction beyond the household, pressures for intensified household production subsidize and the direct extraction of surplus product from women and children declines. This may mean, however, that a wife's isolation and dependence increase as the same time as her exploitation decreases. The ideal of female domesticity, for example, tends to emerge only in family systems where gender relations have been separated from the mechanisms for consolidating property or extracting surplus products and/or labor. In these circumstances male dominance within the family begins to play quite a different role.

When patriarchy is used in its larger sense, as a synonym for a pervasive system of male dominance, it is a term that corresponds to the generic Marxist notion of class society, not to any particular mode of production. It describes a general set of relations that has existed not for all of human history but for most of it and that has been associated with other forms of stratification. Male dominance seems to be an essential element of all socially-stratified societies but it doesn't play the same role or take the same form in each. It must be studied in its concrete manifestations, as it works through particular class relations, specific patterns of inequality, surplus extraction, and power relations. Just as we do not say "the class society," so we should not say "the patriarchy" or "the male dominance."

Most feminist theorists recognize that gender relations alone are never sufficient to explain the total distribution of power and resources in modern society. While they tend to assume (wrongly) that patriarchy was congruent with all previous modes of production, they do attempt to grapple with the more problematic relation between patriarchy and capitalism. Ferguson and Folbre, for example, correctly point out that "when and if children are economically advantageous to the male head of household, there is a particularly strong motive to channel women's productive efforts into childbearing and related forms of sex-affective production" (p. 322), in earlier social formations this led to far more direct and wide-ranging mechanisms of female oppression than those present in modern capitalism. They argue that capitalism generates "new forms of exploitation" (p. 327) in the economic sphere but breaks down old forms of exploitation in the sphere of sex-affective production. They thus visualize patriarchy and capitalism as "two complementary systems which are increasingly coming into conflict."

In a later article, Folbre notes capitalism's evolution away from dependence on family labor, but argues that patriarchal relations trend to be "highly complementary to other class-based relations of production" (p. 333). This leads to a notion of dual systems: two separate modes of production that arise independently and then come into interaction with each other.

In discussing that interaction, Folbre subtly switches from the narrow to the general definition of patriarchy. In the early patriarchal mode of production, she argues, control over women is the main variable determining the accumulation of surplus and the emergence of elites. "Just as capitalism provides an impetus to economic growth by rewarding those who accumulate, accumulate, patriarchy can provide an impetus to population growth by rewarding the patriarch who 'begs, begets'" (p. 333). Under capitalism, the direct link between control over sex-affective production and economic or political privilege is severed. But though capitalism undermined many aspects of traditional patriarchy, it did not subsume it. We continue to see a "distribution of economic power and privilege in contemporary society [that] seems consistent with the persistence of the kinds of contradictory class positions suggested by the intersection of patriarchy and capitalism as modes of production. For some women the privileges of family class counter-balance the liabilities of gender class, while other women are doubly or triply disadvantaged" (p. 334). Suddenly patriarchy becomes an adjective instead of a noun, yet she continues to insist on its essential independence: "patriarchal capitalism...may represent a single social formation comprising two modes of production that interact with, as well as articulate, the other."

But this theoretical conglomerate distorts the concept of a social formation, which is a term used to designate a concrete manifestation of a dominant mode of production in a particular time and place. It also seems an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the mutual dependence of class and gender. The notion of
two independent, intersecting systems, which sometimes conflict and sometimes reinforce each other, does not allow us to explore the common origins of male dominance and socioeconomic stratification. I will argue that the two cannot be separated in their origins and that their periodic conflicts are better explained by the Marxist concept of contradiction: that processes necessary to maintain a set of social relations simultaneously undermine aspects of those relations. There is a pattern to the interaction of gender and class that can only be explained if they exist within a single system.

Marxist theory needs to develop a way of conceptualizing gender, race, and chauvinism as part of the class process. They are not subsumed by class but they are also not separate systems; gender, race, and chauvinism are vital components of the development and dynamics of class. No society has constructed class relations without the aid of specific gender and race dynamics. It is not just a question of adding gender and race analysis to class analysis and bringing them all into interaction, but of expanding our definition of class processes to include gender and race relations.

Reaching this conceptualization requires that we accept the socialist feminist insight that gender and class are both ways of producing, appropriating, and distributing surplus labor. Contrary to radical feminism, there is no reason to assume that gender was originally an exploitative way of organizing and redistributing labor. A wealth of anthropological data now indicates that in many societies, socially-constructed gender roles and ideologies organize work, reciprocity, and social exchange without imposing hierarchies or producing structured inequalities.23

Class, of course, is by definition uneven. It is a system of symbiotic but opposed power relations and interests involved in organizing and contending over the process of defining, producing, appropriating, and distributing surplus labor. One of those power relations is gender.

In The German Ideology Marx suggests that the "mode of cooperation" is inseparable from the productive forces: "a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a productive force." Modes of cooperation -- or coercion -- are critical in defining class, which is, after all, a relationship rather than a quantity of labor. Gender and family relations are central methods of organizing cooperation and coercion, of defining what is surplus labor and ordering its appropriation. They are also sites of contradiction in the Marxist sense -- places where inherent oppositions occur that are both necessary to perpetuate a particular process or social system and yet are also destructive of that process or social system.

In prehistoric and ancient societies, the use of gender relations to extract household surpluses was critical in the development of ranked clans from communal kinship societies, and in the transformation of leading clans' redistribution functions into class privileges. Racial or chauvinistic categories were also central to the development of early class societies: patron-client relations between different kin groups, tributary exchanges, and outright conquest established a lower class of "strangers," who were permanent juniors in relation to the ruling elite. The production and distribution of such hierarchies has helped constitute the class relationships of all new modes of production.

For example, in our work on the origins of gender and class, Peta Henderson and I suggested that egalitarian kinship societies contained the seeds of both gender and socioeconomic inequality in the very mechanisms they originally used to perpetuate reciprocity and social cooperation. Among the most important mechanisms for circulating goods and redistributing labor in such early societies were the institutions of gender roles, marriage, and gift-giving.

Gender, marriage rules, gift-giving customs, and social rituals functioned to circulate goods and labor. Many societies had a division of labor in which females were associated with the tools or products of gathering or horticulture and males with those of hunting, herding and exchange. The labor of women tended to be the stuff of daily subsistence. Female activities were required every day, and female labor was necessary both to support the community when men failed to bring home goods and to process products that men did bring home. Female manufactured goods were available to any household with a woman, and since all female groups could also usually count on roughly similar returns to gathering and horticultural activities there was no need for formal redistribution rules for such goods. Hunting, trade, and raiding, however, could produce ei-
ther big windfalls or nothing at all for a work party. Male goods, therefore, were more likely to require elaborate rules for redistribution, while female goods could be consumed at the family level or distributed through personal networks without fear that other families would go wanting. Marriage formalized this exchange of two different kinds of goods and services. Women controlled the distribution of game or other goods they received from their husbands; men controlled the distribution of products they got from their wives. Note a potential unevenness here...if many male goods are subject to formal redistribution at the group level but women's goods are not, a wife is less likely to have a free hand with her husband's surplus than vice versa. More of the woman's production than the man's is available to go through household redistribution.

At first, although these mechanisms ensured that every member of society would be provided for during the periods in which he or she could not be a producer, they did not provide for the systematic accumulation and concentration of surplus which are necessary to produce a class of permanent non-producers. Unranked kinship societies had no built-in incentive or mechanism for increasing surplus. To the contrary, they had many mechanisms for getting rid of a surplus and ensuring that it did not pile up regularly in the hands of any particular sector of society: exchange of goods in division of labor; marriage rules (exogamy, sections and subsections), hospitality customs, and an ideology that made generosity the primary source of prestige.

Some societies existed for tens of thousands of years without breaking out of this pattern. Occasionally, however, there was some development of the forces of production or reproduction such that surpluses began to regularly accrue to one sector of society, giving one or another kin or territorial group consistently greater access to a surplus. The immediate result of this was not to trigger some innate human drive toward accumulation. Quite the contrary. People responded to these changes in productive forces by elaborating a superstructure that could preserve the old values: Kinship rules and leadership structures became more important, not for exploitation but for redistribution; gender roles and marriage rules move beyond structuring reciprocity to organizing redistribution. This elevates the male role in societies where men tend to be responsible for redistribution and external exchange, and it creates the temptation for redistributive figures to augment their feasts and gift-giving by increasing household production.

As Friedman and Rowlands point out, all lineage societies have the structural potential for ranking built into their originally egalitarian social relationships. In kin society, the marriage alliance network 'may be a fundamental or even dominant relation of production...since it is a major factor in the distribution of total social labor.' (p. 206). A marriage alliance system such as patrilocality, which moves productive women into the households of male redistributive heads, has much greater potential to create exceptionally active and therefore powerful redistributive household heads than neolocal or matrilocal marriage systems, which do not allow for such concentration and redistribution of wealth by household heads.

By the egalitarian principles of reciprocity, all surpluses must be redistributed through feasting. But if one or another lineage consistently feasts the rest, it gains, even without self-enhancement, a reputation for special proximity to the ancestors and to the supernatural. "Within the local community, such a lineage would be an older lineage, a direct descendant of the territorial ancestor spirit of that larger group..."

But there is a potential contradiction in the mechanisms that keep the old order going the leading lineages, by the principles of reciprocity, get back gifts or labor (spouses, clients, foster children). At first they redistribute their growing surpluses but at some point, usually when they start to get things from another territorial group, they begin to be able to hold back resources and even call on the labor of others. This occurs not because of greed but because of contradictions in the ideal of reciprocity itself.

The sexual division of labor that had once been a social convenience seems to be a common means of accelerating differences among local lineages and/or households to this level. A critical factor in the development of ranking into social stratification is the concentration of wealth and authority within a local lineage, as opposed to its distribution among dispersed (lineal or collateral) kindred. Such a concentration allows for the maximization of household production, which is identified by Marshall Sahlins as the key element in the development of surplus production and eco-
nomic differentiation. It also undermines the constraints on accumulation imposed by the obligations of the local lineage to the larger (dispersed) kin corporation. As noted above, patrilocal society offered more opportunities for a local lineage to concentrate labor, wealth, and power than did matrilocality.

Patrilocal societies concentrated related males in the same local lineages, where they lived together, subject to the authority of the ancestors and their living representatives, usually senior men. The obligations of these men were thus to spatially close relatives (and ancestors), rather than, as in matrilocal societies, being divided between their wives', their sisters' and their ancestors' households. In both matrilocal and patrilocal societies, male products tended to be the subject of more elaborate redistribution ceremonies than female ones. In patrilocal situations, then, the concentration of males at the local level provided for greater variability in the amount available for redistribution by the clan or kin redistributive heads. Even in the absence of polygyny, male activities were more likely to result in differences in formal redistributive occasions between local lineages than female ones. Yet wives' services and products were necessary for the feasts that local patrilineages could host at redistribution ceremonies. Because women tended to produce for the household rather than for wider kin networks, their products could be added to the male surpluses and used for feasting, eventually producing the 'big man' phenomenon.

Patrilocal kin corporations could make better use of the household production needed to transform male or female surpluses into feasts than could matrilocal societies, because lines of authority in external exchange were reinforced by domestic lines of authority. In patrilocal societies the people who provided the labor necessary for transforming surpluses into feasts (wives), were not owners within the kin corporation and therefore had less say over the allocation of food and other goods for consumption versus redistribution. This left them vulnerable to demands that they increase their household production of articles for redistribution by male household heads. Those with an interest in increasing redistributive activities (male functions) also had domestic authority over household production, and could thus use household land lineage production more readily for exchanges among lineages.

Patrilocal lineages also had an advantage in the utilization of surpluses for redistribution because they were able to rapidly expand their supply of female labor—the key labor in feasting and preparation for redistribution—through marriage and polygyny. It is easier and faster to find a marriageable woman than to rear a daughter to maturity. Since the labor of women was a more constant requirement than that of men, this was a significant advantage. Any increase in the time men spent in wealth-getting expeditions, the amount of goods brought back, or the number of men involved in production or redistribution would require a proportionate increase in the amount of subsistence and/or processing work for women. Women were needed to free up male labor, to produce the food and other consumables necessary in feasting, or simple to process any new products. Where the same amount of male labor might on occasion bring in an unforeseen amount of goods, as with a lucky hunt or raid, or a successful trading expedition, the returns to female labor were less variable from lineage to lineage. A big advantage for the accumulation of wealth by local patrilineages, then, was their ability to take advantage of surpluses or trading opportunities by increasing their female labor supply, especially through polygyny.

Finally, the circulation of women in marriage exchange systems, especially in conjunction with polygyny, had a further important implication for the elaboration of wealth and power differentials among lineages different from the circulation of men. Because women created a new generation of laborers in addition to contributing their own work, societies in which women moved and multiple wives could be brought in had more potential for a long-term, uneven accumulation of labor. This in turn would have greatly accelerated the process of socio-economic differentiation: the more labor a lineage had, the more bridewealth it could produce and the more feasts it could host, calling forth even more in labor and obligations.

In summary, Peta Henderson and I argued that the social relations inherent in patrilocality could have served as a starting mechanism for ranking and eventually for social stratification in the Neolithic world through their greater ability to channel labor and prestige into a single local lineage, thus creating the potential for development of inter-lineage inequality. Alternatively, as wealth and surpluses increased in matrilocal society, local lineages
would have had an incentive to shift to virilocality (either avunculocality or patrilineal/patrilocality). Men who acquired movable property could offer a bride-price to induce other lineages to shift from brother-to-sister exchange, while women would have had an interest in agreeing to marry out so as to gain wealth and prestige for their natal kin group, in which they remained co-owners even after they had moved to their husbands’ locality.

Rank differences between local lineages emerged from a situation where successful large-scale feasting enhanced the prestige and welfare of the feast-giving group. But the ability to feast and redistribute generously depended upon the ability of the successful group to control the labor necessary for feasting. It is in this sense that we believe the subordination of female labor and reproductive power in marriage was a precondition for the emergence of other forms of stratification. The fact that men required the services of wives more than women required the services of husbands made control over marriage a greater source of power in patrilocial societies than in matrilocial ones, enabling senior men to use the threat of withholding a wife to control junior men. The intersection between wealth accumulation and polygyny restricted the access of some groups, and of some men (juniors) within groups, to wives, and thus to future as well as present labor. Polygyny created a potential scarcity of women because it allowed some men to monopolize many women. The power of some men over other men thus increased as a result of the increase in the power of all men over their wives. Once women’s valuable labor and reproductive power could be restricted and manipulated by different lineages, the marriage exchange system that had originally emerged to maintain equality among groups became transformed into a system that expressed rank differences in society through an inflation of bride-wealth.

This account is, of course, highly speculative, and may well be wrong. But in every case we know, the subordination of women was an integral part of class formation and paved the way for the development of the state. It is no accident that in ancient Mesopotamia, the word for slave originally meant a captive female. In later historical periods as well gender relations are inextricably intertwined with class ones. It is possible, of course, to argue that because gender is historically prior to class and because male dominance has been such an intractable, pervasive historical force, we should conclude from this that gender must be redefined to encompass class rather than vice versa. Many feminists have argued with Gayle Rubin that the sex/gender system is the proper conceptual framework for studying the reproduction of domination and inferiority in any system. We should focus, they say, on the mode of reproduction, with its special dynamics of creating gender and socializing the young to accept the allocation of productive roles. Arguments that the sex/gender system has greater explanatory power than class are supported by the many studies that show very little change in women’s lives in relation to the “big” forces: Over the past 1000 years at least there has been considerable continuity in the oppression of women and the reproduction of social inequality through gender and the family. In most people’s lives, gender (and race) are more salient determinants of social being than class. They are felt at a more personal level and experienced as less conscious or voluntary modes of identification. Why, then, do we argue that class, properly defined, must remain the linchpin of Marxist and feminist analysis?

This is not a question of political or moral primacy but of theoretical usefulness. Though race and gender may be more salient factors in the description or explanation both of long-term constants and short-run variations, class better explains long-term patterns of change. From the very beginning of male dominance, women were divided by their social position as much as they were united by their gender. While gender defined women’s personal lives more than any other factor, class predicted their political positions and social action better than gender. In American history, Nancy Hewitt comments on the fact that women have consistently worked in same-sex organizations but in defense of class interests that are closer to those of their menfolk than to those of other women’s organizations from different sectors of society.

Male dominance has been extraordinarily persistent, and we can argue that its existence has often served as a base for class society, but its form has changed more in response to changes in class society than vice versa. Indeed, the very intractability of male dominance is a reason that class remains central to our analysis, for sexism has not produced collec-
tive actors against men in the way that class has produced collective actors against ruling elites. Women emerged as collective actors on gender issues in the period of capitalist expansion, but their demands and organizations can best be explained by the dynamics of that expansion. Thus, for example, women's rights movements arose as an extension of bourgeois rights and later of struggles over other issues, such as civil rights and the antiwar movement. In other areas of the world, women mobilized traditional organizations or ideologies in new ways in opposition to capitalist expansion, while more recently, the changing nature of capitalist production, which draws women into labor market and commodities women's services, has created a new set of gender issues and conflicts.

Men and women experience class differently. They are drawn into characteristically different types of class conflict and class collaboration. But their concrete experience of gender depends upon their class. Gender divides men and women into two different receptacles, you might say; but the actual filling of each depends on class, and gender must work through class when women and men move into action. In America, the gender gap in voting, for example, has more to do with class divisions than clear male-female differences, witness the fact that it didn't develop when feminists thought it would, with the vote, but only since the expansion of new service, welfare, and part-time work and the emergence of conflicts over how these are distributed. Women comprise more than 70% of the so-called "new classes" and are therefore most affected by the cutbacks of social services in the past 10 years.

Finally, in fighting both sexism and racism we see the continued pre-eminence of class. For a program to eliminate these evils requires taking sides along class lines. Any attack on sexism, for example, means making demands on the state, and all demands on the state have a class content, either implicitly or explicitly. When gender has led women beyond their class, it has led them to identify with a different class rather than to develop a program that crosses class lines in meaningful ways. Cross-class alliances are vital, both as part of a transitional program and as way through which working women can sometimes gain needed leverage against men of their class, but we must keep the end well in view: these are cross-class alliances to advance a class program.

To defend the retention of class analysis is not to suggest that gender can in any way be subsumed in class. A major problem for Marxism today is to understand the concrete conditions that have divided workers and prevented the growth of class solidarity. Foremost among these have been the working of racism and sexism. These issues must therefore be at the very forefront of any serious class struggle in the modern world.

As a gender, moreover, women of all classes have been assigned to certain kinds of sex-typed work, made responsible for characteristic kinds of services, and had their needs and desires subordinated to those of the mean of their class. The meaning of class itself is different for each gender, which means that you cannot organize a class simply by appealing to the needs and interests of one half its members. The needs and interests of the female half include a thorough-going struggle against the personal, political, and ideological structures of male dominance, as well as the economic ones.
Notes


10. Rogers, p 146


13. Leacock, 'Women, Power and Authority'


15. Turnbull, p. 206

16. Sanda, pp. 15-34


23. This information is summarized by Stephanie Coontz and Peta Henderson in their contributions to Women's Work, Men's Property: The Origins of Gender and Class. (London: Verso, 1986)


25. Friedman and Rowlands, p. 207


29. Friedman, 1975; Friedman and Rowlands, 1978

30. Murdoch. 1949

31. Sacks, 1979

32. Friedman, 1975

33. Ibid; Meillassoux 1981